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The threat of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the critical 
infrastructure (oil pipeline) in Kenya has brought to the attention the strategic issue 
of the energy sector security, highlighting the potential vulnerabilities of this sector. 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) should be a key component of the national 
security especially after the Kenya Defence Forces’ (KDF) incursion into Somalia. 
The merger of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda terrorist groups and the accelerated 
grenades attack against Kenya in retaliation has become the centre of the debate 
on terrorism and internal security of the Kenya. The energy resources are strategic 
assets from the security, political and economic point of view. Kenya as an oil 
transit country is considered of primary strategic importance at international level. 
International terrorism has always looked with interest at the oil resource in order 
to meet its political and economic targets. We argue that Kenya’s oil pipelines are 
vulnerable to Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda terrorist attack.  In summary, the article 
looks at the concept of terrorism within the framework of critical infrastructure 
protection, the dangers of attacks on oil pipelines, Kenya’s government preparedness 
and recommendations.
key words: terrorism, critical infrastructure protection, vulnerability, protection.
1. iNTrODUCTiON
Terrorism worldwide is changing 
with the innovations in information 
communication technology (ICT). 
As a result, terrorist activities 
have evolved into a remodeled 
guerilla warfare, which has led the 
international, regional and national 
security apparatus to switch from 
conventional war tactics to localized 
counter-terrorism operations [1].
Terrorism has become a core 
component of the global geo-
economic feature with respect to 
the energy sector because there is a 
linkage between scaled up terrorist 
activities and energy generation [2]. 
The world population is growing 
at an alarming rate compared to the 
scarce resources. According to the 
United Nations University 2020 
Global Energy Scenarios, the world 
has entered the age of resource-
driven  conflicts  and  the  terrorist 
activity region-wide and the oil price 
growth are interrelated. Therefore, 
the objective of terrorist and extremist 
groups is no longer to overthrow 
central government and gain civil 
rights which were denied to their 
social, ethnic or religious group, 
but to establish and retain control 
over resources [3].24
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2. METHODOLOGY
The research employed 
quantitative and qualitative research 
methods. Because of the nature 
of the research topic, the research 
was formed through the analysis of 
secondary data and in this respect, 
extensive library research was done, 
where journals, internet, newspapers, 
books, and reports were consulted 
and studied. According to Bryman [4] 
secondary analysis is analysis of data 
by researchers who will probably not 
have been involved in the collection 
of data and, in addition, is concerned 
with analyzing already collected data 
within another study [5]. Secondary 
analysis allows for the examination of 
existing data yet can produce new and 
more detailed information, including 
the emergence of conclusions that 
differ to those in the original report 
[6]. The advantages of secondary 
analysis are that it provides high 
quality data [7], quick and easy access 
to materials as documentary research 
is largely free of the restrictions and 
difficulties  faced  in  primary  data 
research, the researchers do not 
encounter rejection, non-response, 
bias, or any other respondent-based 
problems [8]. People in the oil 
transport business were interviewed 
and provided primary data. A total 
of one hundred and seventeen (117) 
people were interviewed.
3. TErrOriSM
Terrorism is a subfield of peace 
and  Conflict  studies  that  analyses 
the interactions between states and 
other actors in their engagement 
with each other over legitimacy 
[9]. It is one of the most disputed 
terms and has no comprehensive 
definition  [10].  Terrorism  refers  to 
the deliberate killing of civilians, or 
to the doing of extensive damage to 
their property, with the intention of 
spreading fear through a population 
and communicating a political 
message to a third party, usually a 
government[11]. 
A terrorist is someone who 
opposes the established order either at 
national level or internationally. Even 
if engaged in a restrained military 
campaign against an un-democratic, 
racist or repressive regime, these 
individuals are still ‘terrorists’, and 
the government forces that oppose 
them ‘counter-terrorists’ [12].
The French Republic coined 
the term ‘terror’ as a measure to 
counter-revolutionaries against the 
weak government in 1795 and as 
a policy to protect itself [13]. The 
Bolsheviks used it to legitimize 
their actions against enemies of the 
state [14]. According to Jenkins [15] 
‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom  fighter’,  is  often  used  to 
highlight the problem of implying 
a moral judgment when classifying 
the term ‘terrorism’. If one identifies 
with the victim of the attack, then it 
is considered terrorism, but if one 
can identify with the perpetrator he 
or she is seen as a liberator. This 
elusiveness  reflects  the  fact  that 
the meaning of the term terrorism 
remains contested. It can be used in 
relation to violence by states against 
their subjects, sometimes referred 
to as ‘enforcement terrorism’ or 
‘terrorism from above’ [16].  It can 
be used more broadly to describe 
violent actions in a civil war or other 
conflict. It can also describe isolated 
acts of violence separate from a situation 
of war, intended to cause terror rather 
than contribute to a broader conflict. By 
extension, this type of terrorism can refer to 
acts of violence carried out internationally, Journal of Defense Resources Management  Vol. 5, Issue 1 (8) /2014
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in a third country apart from the location 
of its political cause [17].
“Terrorism means premeditated, 
politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against non- combatant 
targets by sub-national groups or 
clandestine agents, usually intended 
to  influence  an  audience.”    The  
definitions  propose the  motive  of   
“furtherance  of  political  or  social 
objectives”.   Such motives include 
religious, cultural, economic or 
psychological factors. Increasingly 
important, however, is the question 
of targets [18].
In traditional discussions about 
terrorism, targets are usually 
governments, political figures, objects 
of economic or social significance, or 
random civilians. But the motives and 
targets can include environmental and 
ecological resources such as water 
and built water systems. The social 
and cultural value and importance of 
oil pipeline systems also make them 
attractive targets.  By calling  attention  
to  the  inability  of  governments  to   
protect  vital  symbols  of civilization,  
terrorists  can raise  doubts  about   
controlling  authorities  [19].  “The 
relatively high efficiency of terrorism 
derives from its symbolic nature. If 
the terrorist comprehends that he is 
seeking a demonstration effect, he 
will attack targets with a maximum 
symbolic value.”  There are few 
natural resources with more symbolic 
power than water and oil [20].
The  United Nations General 
Assembly’s Declaration on Measures 
to Eliminate International Terrorism, 
set out in its resolution 49/60 that 
terrorism includes “criminal acts 
intended or calculated to provoke a 
state of terror in the general public, a 
group of persons or particular persons 
for political purposes” and that such 
acts  “are in any circumstances 
unjustifiable, whatever the 
considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, 
ethnic, religious or other nature 
that may be invoked to justify 
them” [21].
4. vULNErAbiLiTY OF 
kENYA’S CriTiCAL 
iNFrASTrUCTUrE (OiL 
PiPELiNE) TO AL SHAbAAb 
ATTACkS 
Al Shabaab employs extremist 
intimidation and terror tactics 
designed to instill fear in the 
population. Its so-called religious 
police mete out severe punishments, 
including  floggings,  amputations, 
stoning, and beheadings, for 
violations of its strict interpretation 
of Islamic law [22]. Al Shabaab has 
conducted kidnappings, shootings, 
and targeted political assassinations, 
not  only  of  TFG  officials  but  also 
journalists, civil society activists, 
and aid workers.
Al Shabaab’s use of improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide 
bombers is a new dimension in the 
context  of  somali  conflict,  tactics 
of urban warfare that have been 
successfully used by terrorists in 
Iraq and elsewhere. U.N. experts 
suggest that the IEDs used by Al 
Shabaab have become increasingly 
sophisticated, as have the tactics 
for their use, and the planning and 
execution of the suicide bombings 
of AMISOM targets indicate a level 
of expertise reminiscent of AQ 
operations [23].  In 2007, Al Shabaab 
claimed responsibility for at least 
five  successful  suicide  bombings 
[24]. In 2008, Somalia ranked fourth 
globally, behind Iraq, Pakistan, 
and Afghanistan, in the number of 
fatalities incurred by terrorist attacks 26
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[25]. Among the attacks attributed 
to Al Shabaab was the coordinated 
suicide  bombing  of  five  targets, 
including the U.N. Development 
Program (UNDP), in Somaliland and 
Puntland in 2008. The above cited 
incidences affirm the vulnerability of 
critical infrastructure (oil pipeline) in 
Kenya to Al Shabaab attack. 
4.1. Oil Pipelines and Terrorism
Pipelines are the safest and 
fastest form of energy transportation, 
when compared to other modes 
of transportation such as rail and 
highway. However, it is more 
vulnerable to terrorists attacks [26]. 
Prevention methods are superior 
to detection and should always be 
noted that any ‘detection’ means 
a ‘prevention’ methods has failed 
[27]. Oil pipeline Companies should 
have ‘management systems’ which 
allow threats within the system to be 
identified, and mitigated [28]. Pipelines 
can be a target for attack by terrorists 
[29].The terrorists prefer hard targets 
like security forces, high ranking 
government officials, diplomats and only 
turn to soft targets like transportation, 
infrastructure, hospitality, leisure and 
entertainment as a last resort [30].
Pipelines are ‘high value’ targets, 
and  unfortunately  they  are  difficult 
to protect, and are soft targets. 
They extend over long distances, 
and their location can be posted in 
company websites [31]. A typical 
attack may involve a cell of terrorists 
and pipelines may not be the prime 
target for terrorists, as they may not 
produce the publicity the terrorists 
desire like high number of death, 
casualties and extensive media 
coverage. Nevertheless, terrorism is 
on the increase in Kenya, and pipeline 
systems might be prime targets. The 
government should empower and partner 
with the private security firms to protect 
pipelines infrastructure [32]. 
4.2. Precedence of Oil Pipelines 
Terrorist Attacks
There have been attack and 
attempts on Oil pipelines by terrorists. 
For several years the Shell Company 
in Nigeria have been dealing with ‘hot 
tapping’ (drilling into a pressurized 
pipeline) and ‘bunkering’ or illegally 
obtaining fuel from pipelines [33].   
Colombia’s Caño limón oil pipeline 
has been attacked several times by 
the National Liberation Army since 
1986, while in 2003 Iraq’s main oil 
pipeline from the Kirkuk oilfields in 
the north to Turkey’s Mediterranean 
port of Ceyhun was attacked [34] 
and between 2003 and 2007 there 
were 449 reported attacks against 
Iraqi oil infrastructure targets. In 
2007 there were also attacks on 
Mexican pipelines by the Popular 
Liberation Army [35].
In 2007, a terrorist plot to destroy 
fuel pipelines at John F Kennedy 
airport was foiled by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations [36]. Other 
potential attacks were uncovered 
and disrupted in the planning stage, 
including a surveillance of oil storage 
facilities in Australia and the U.S. in 
2005 and 2006, respectively [37], 
the narrowly averted double vehicle 
bomb attack on the world’s largest 
petroleum facility Abqaiq in Saudi 
Arabia in February 2006 [38], a 
threat to Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia 
and  Bahraini  refineries  in  October 
2006 [39] and the unsuccessful 
attack  on  a  Yemeni  oil  refinery 
in September 2006 [40]. It seems 
likely that a number of other such 
threats have been disrupted but not 
publicized for security reasons.
4.3. The risk of Oil Supply 
interruption due to a Terrorist 
attack on Oil Pipelines
The possibility of attacks on oil 
installations, pipelines, offshore Journal of Defense Resources Management  Vol. 5, Issue 1 (8) /2014
27 27
[49].  Because some of these sub-
stations are located in remote areas, 
the vulnerability to terrorist attack is 
increased [50].
 Though Kenya pipeline Company, 
a major energy facility, have elaborate 
security programs in partnership with 
private security firms, in most cases 
private security guards are unlikely 
to be able to repel a determined 
attack by well-armed terrorists. In 
Kenya, private security guards are 
not allowed to carry guns and some 
companies have firm “no weapons” 
policies at all their locations. In 
reality, the private security guards 
focus on industrial safety, accident 
prevention and mitigation, ensuring 
that only authorized personnel 
have access to critical facilities, 
and preventing pilferage or theft 
of products [51]. Consequently, it 
is not surprising that in most of the 
major energy companies the heads of 
security report directly to the board 
with several levels of management 
between them and the board which 
affirms that security is a key priority 
for senior management [52].
In Kenya security against external 
and internal terrorist threats is 
provided by Kenya Defence Forces 
(KDF), National Intelligence Service 
(NIS) and the National Police 
Service (NPS) personnel [53] but 
in most cases private security firms 
are responsible for security outside 
the Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(CIP) facility perimeter and usually 
control both vehicle and personnel 
access at the gates. Typically, they 
also work closely with the nation’s 
intelligence professionals to identify 
and defeat threats before they can 
approach the perimeter [54]. In 
principle, the private security firms 
at the perimeter should have the 
personnel, weaponry, and training 
to repel an attack by a determined 
and well-armed group of terrorists 
installations and tankers are an 
attractive target for the disaffected 
[41]. There was a probable risk of 
terrorist attacks on oil facilities in 
the Middle East as part of “a move 
from symbolic targets to economic 
targets” [42]. Although there is increased 
awareness of the risks of terrorist attacks, 
the critical infrastructure management 
needs to increase resources to address this 
risk [43]. However, security experts opine 
that the risk of a successful terrorist attack 
is high, especially for energy facilities 
located in isolated locations [44].
 This view is corroborated by the 
postings on jihad websites and the 
escalation of the rhetoric regarding 
the need to attack energy facilities 
is reflected in fatwas. For example, 
in June 2004 Shaykh Abdullah bin 
Nasser al-Rashid issued a fatwa 
entitled “The Laws of Targeting 
Petroleum-Related Interests and 
a Review of the Laws Pertaining 
to the Economic Jihad” [45]. Also 
published in 2006 was a “Decree 
on Targeting Oil Installations”, 
which gave comprehensive religious 
and political arguments in favor of 
attacks on energy facilities [46]. In 
2007, an article entitled “Bin Laden 
and the Oil Weapon” was published, 
calling for attacks worldwide on oil 
facilities supplying the United States 
of America [47]. 
5. kENYA’S GOvErNMENT 
SECUriTY AGENCiES & THE 
PrivATE SECUriTY FirMS 
The transportation of oil from 
Mombasa to Nairobi is mostly done 
through pipelines. The pipelines are 
built on the land surface and therefore 
are highly visible, or in the subsoil but 
also in this case are easily detectable 
[48]. At times the sub-stations along 
the oil pipeline are usually protected 
by a few guards from private security 
firms and sometimes left unprotected 28
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using car or truck bombs, automatic 
weapons, and high explosives. In 
practice, however, experience to date 
indicates that the private security 
firms are seldom up to the task [55].
Even in cases where it is the 
armed government security personnel 
manning these Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (CIP) the armed 
government forces may not provide 
adequate security because the Kenya 
government have not yet designated 
a single ministry that has both the 
responsibility for security at energy 
facilities and the authority needed 
to implement effective security 
measures [56]. Second, “stove-
piping” and competition between 
ministries inhibit cooperation and 
information sharing between all of 
the parties involved in security issues. 
Third, the authority to make decisions 
regarding a response to an attack is 
usually restricted to relatively high-
ranking officers rather than delegated 
to the junior or non-commissioned 
officers  who  would  bear  the  brunt 
of an attack [57]. As a result, no one 
can or will make a decision in real 
time to counter an attack, effectively 
paralyzing  the  defence  and  finally, 
prevailing attitudes like “it can’t 
happen here”, or that “if it does, it is 
God’s will and nothing can be done” 
need to be overcome [58].
It is prudent to note that the 
security status at many energy 
facilities is unsatisfactory and this 
may be attributed to the following 
factors: the security departments 
in companies are severely limited 
by budgetary constraints since they 
compete with other departments for 
the little resources as the companies 
may give a higher priority to other 
concerns and security professionals tend 
to rely upon familiar approaches and 
tried and true solutions, and they are often 
intrinsically distrustful of the new and 
the unfamiliar ones. This can lead to the 
unfortunate situation of “doing the same 
thing, over and over again, but expecting 
different results” [59].
6. DETErrENT OF 
AL-SHAbAAb & AL-QAEDA 
TErrOriST rECrUiTMENT
 
The Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda 
terrorist threat in Kenya today 
consists of tiny conspiracies and on-
off attacks [60]. The continued trust 
and cooperation of most Kenyans, 
tips to police from the family 
members and close acquaintances of 
those heading toward radicalization, 
alert citizens, and focused intelligence-
collection efforts will remain essential 
components of the thus-far successful 
containment of domestic Al-Shabaab 
and Al-Qaeda terrorism [61].
Traditional law enforcement, in 
which authorities attempt to identify 
and apprehend a perpetrator after 
a crime has been committed, is 
inadequate to deal with terrorists 
who are determined to cause many 
deaths and great destruction and 
who may not care whether they 
themselves survive [62]. Apart 
from traditional law enforcement, 
security intelligence collection, and 
community policing, public reaction 
is an essential component of internal 
security.  Public safety demands 
a more proactive and preventive 
approach intervention before an 
attack occurs like the grenade attack 
in Machakos country bus [63].
With the increase of Kenyan youth’s 
un-employment, their recruitment 
and radicalization into Al-Shabaab 
and Al-Qaeda terrorism remain a 
reality. Therefore, the international 
and domestic intelligence collection 
must remain a top priority. Under 
appropriate controls, intelligence 
operations can disrupt terrorist 
recruiting, uncover terrorist plots, 
and discourage those who would turn Journal of Defense Resources Management  Vol. 5, Issue 1 (8) /2014
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to violence [64]. Consequently, by 
preventing dramatic terrorist actions 
that inevitably create fear and alarm, 
intelligence operations can also 
prevent overreactions by the general 
public, allay unwarranted suspicions, 
and thereby protect vulnerable 
minorities (in this case, the Kenyan 
Muslim community) against official 
discrimination and even individual 
acts of revenge [65].
Meanwhile, expanded efforts 
must be made through community 
policing and other means to work with 
Kenyan youths. These efforts must entail 
working with the youths actively and 
consistently to address issues of youth 
empowerment, fears of victimization, 
crime, the suspicions of authorities and 
other concerns [66].
Peers, friends, parents and 
relatives are often more likely than the 
authorities to know when someone is 
turning against legitimate authority, 
anti-establishment and heading 
toward radicalization. On such 
occasion peers, friends, parents and 
relatives should intervene [67]. But 
in most cases the mistrust between 
the public and the police may hinder 
the citizens from notifying the police 
when a youth is being radicalized. 
Therefore, maintaining  good 
relationships between the police with 
all members of the public without 
stigmatizing any group or privileging 
special interests is of paramount 
importance [68].Un-warranted alarm, 
exaggerated portrayals of the terrorist 
threat, unrealistic expectations of a 
risk-free society, and unreasonable 
demands for absolute protection will 
only encourage terrorists’ ambitions 
to  make  Kenya  fibrillate  in  fear 
and bankrupt itself with security. 
As long as Kenya’s psychological 
vulnerability is on display, Al-
Shabaab and Al-Qaeda terrorist will 
find inspiration, and more recruitment 
and terrorism will occur [69].
7. rECOMMENDATiONS
A.  The security agencies in 
Kenya should enhance partnerships 
with  the  private  security  firms  to 
improve security in energy sector 
and facilities in Kenya.  Reducing 
Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda terrorist 
risks at these facilities constitute 
an immediate objective of national 
intelligence services and law-
enforcement agencies.
b. According to Felter et al. 
[70], unemployed youths are easy to 
recruit and radicalize by extremist 
groups like Al-Shabab and therefore, 
the Kenyan government should 
empower them economically.
C.  The anti-terrorist security 
interests of Kenya overlap with its 
economic interests. We believe that 
boosting business and restoring 
large-scale economic ties among 
East Africa Community in the area of 
energy resources and energy supply, 
forces us to employ a more pragmatic 
and legally considered approach to 
address terrorist threats, as part of a 
transport security strategy.
D. Private and public security 
forces should take into account regional 
specifics when addressing the issues of 
critical infrastructure protection from 
sabotage from Al-Shabaab and Al-
Qaeda terrorist attacks.
E.  The most fundamental 
action that can be taken to protect 
oil pipe line systems is to limit or 
deny physical access to vulnerable 
points. Sometimes this may be as 
easy as locking gates or buildings, or 
reducing public access to sensitive 
locations. The government should 
station guards at “critical sites” [71] 
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